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PROLOGUE
This essay grew out a presentation I gave, as one of several 
foreign legal academics working in Japan, on the theme “Key 
Words for Understanding Japanese Law.” Of course I recognized 
from the outset that reducing the essence of a legal system (or 
any other complex phenomenon) to a single “key word” would 
entail a loss of nuance. But I thought (and still think) the 
assigned theme was a fair and valuable one. After all, cartoons 
and caricatures can be illuminating. There’s nothing necessarily 
wrong with putting an equivocating academic’s feet to the fire 
and making him answer the question definitively, “What is it 
about Japanese law—if anything—that is so different?”
. Professor, Faculty of Law, Sophia University. The author thanks 
Todd Landau, Hugo Vanneck, and Nick Benes for their generous help with this 
essay. 
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What I did not foresee was that I would be one of the
presenters foolhardy enough actually to accept the challenge of 
reducing Japanese law to a single word. The key word I chose 
was “Vagueness,” as you will see in more detail if you keep 
reading. What I also failed to anticipate was the controversy my 
presentation would arouse, at least among the foreigners in the 
audience. A quarter century’s absence from America – while 
living and working in Japan - had rendered me insensitive to the 
fact that making bold generalizations about cultures, bringing 
attention to cultural differences, is now dangerous territory in 
American academic circles. As I delivered my presentation, I 
saw foreigners in the audience shaking their heads and dropping
their jaws in seeming disbelief, as if to say, “No, you can’t say 
that!” Meanwhile, the Japanese members of the audience seemed 
to be smiling in recognition, apparently unaware that cultural 
profiling these days is a breach of good manners outside Japan.
Japanese scholars and journalists, and the Japanese in general, 
have never been inhibited about exploring, explaining and 
celebrating cultural differences between themselves and 
foreigners. Japan continues to be conscious of, and proud of, its 
“Japanese-ness” and cultural “uniqueness,” just as it is 
unashamedly entertained by television documentaries showing 
the strange customs and eating habits of non-Japanese natives 
around the world. Against this background, it should come as no 
surprise that a branch of Japanese legal scholarship has been 
devoted to explaining a unique “Japanese legal consciousness” 
that fundamentally differs from “Western legal consciousness.”
During the century following the opening of Japan to the 
West, Western scholars and observers of Japan, from Lafcadio 
Hearn1 to Ruth Benedict2, also unselfconsciously explained and 
1. Lafcadio Hearn (1850 – 1904), who lived in and wrote about Japan 
from 1890 until his death in 1904, describes Japanese culture as lacking the 
sense of individual consciousness and individual legal rights that are associated 
with the West. 
2. Ruth Benedict (1887 – 1948), whose study of Japanese culture The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946) contrasts Western “guilt-based” 
mentalities with Japanese “shame based” mentalities.
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affirmed sharp cultural dichotomies between Japan and the West.
As regards Japanese law, Western observers of this period were 
consistent in their claim that the Japanese people, over a long 
and ancient history, have shown a weak to nonexistent sense of 
individual rights and the rule of law. Of greater importance 
under Japanese law are notions of family and public sentiment.3
However, by the time Japan emerged as a major economic 
power in the 1970’s, and at the same time that foreign legal 
scholars began to take a more specialized interest in the Japanese 
legal system, the ideological and intellectual climate in academic 
circles outside Japan had changed. The main tendency of more 
recent Western scholarship on the Japanese legal system has 
been to de-bunk Japanese exceptionalism as “myth”4 or “urban 
legend”5 and to shy away from an anthropological approach 
altogether. In rough approximation, the more recent school of 
non-Japanese scholars of Japanese law seem to be saying that 
“people are people” everywhere, and that differences in behavior 
(such as tendencies to litigate or appoint outside directors) do not 
reflect innate culture, but rather reflect objective institutional and 
economic constraints to which all human beings respond 
universally in the same way.
3. See, e.g. LAFCADIO HEARN, JAPAN: AN ATTEMPT AT 
INTERPRETATION (1904) 353, 387: 
The Anglo-Saxon idea of inflexible law is the idea of a justice 
impartial and pitiless as fire: whoever breaks the law must 
suffer the consequence, just as surely as the person who puts 
his hand into fire must experience pain. But in the 
administration of the old Japanese law, everything was taken 
into consideration: the condition of the offender, his 
intelligence, his degree of education, his previous conduct, his 
motives, suffering endured, provocation received, and so 
forth; and final judgment was decided by moral common sense 
rather than by legal enactment or precedent. . . . T]he ordinary 
person would not dream of attempting to claim a legal right 
opposed to common opinion. Family and public sentiment are 
still more potent than law.
4. John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 Journal of 
Japanese Studies 359 (1978).
5. YOSHIRO MIWA & J. MARK RAMSEYER, THE FABLE OF THE 
KEIRETSU: URBAN LEGENDS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY (2006). In a similar 
vein, see PETER N. DALE, THE MYTH OF JAPANESE UNIQUENESS (1986).
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In the closing section of this essay I will offer a few 
comments on the political and ideological ironies of more recent 
Western academic writing on Japanese law. For now, suffice it to 
say that, in my view, scholarship in this vein is itself culture-
bound: it exemplifies precisely the universalistic Judeo-Christian 
values (“God created all of his children equal”) to which well-
meaning Western missionaries have failed to convert the pagan 
natives over the centuries.
I. VAGUENESS
As the foregoing prologue admits, I come to the task of 
defining “vagueness” fully aware that it is fraught with risk.
So here goes: For me, “vagueness” is as good a “key word” as 
any to suggest the essence of Japanese law. The Japanese 
conception of individual rights, both in relation to the state and 
other private individuals, is vague. The operative legal rules—
what you may do, must do, may not do-- are intentionally vague.
Enforcement of rules is weak and situational. Japanese judicial 
opinions are vague. The Japanese language, the medium through 
which the law operates, is itself inherently vague.6
As we know in the West, law is not supposed to be vague.
Vagueness is antithetical to the proper function of law. Clear 
rights and the boundaries they entail are what protect an 
individual from tyranny and abuse by the state. Clear contract 
and property rights are the basic working components of a free 
market. Vague rules invite arbitrary enforcement by the 
authorities. When judges decide cases, legitimacy and due 
process demand a clear statement of reasons and consistency 
with existing rules and precedent.7 To the extent that law is 
6. WILLIAM MCCLURE, USING JAPANESE: A GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY 
USAGE 124 (2000), “Japanese is well-known for vague speech, and the 
language is full of expressions which allow explicit (and often difficult or 
awkward) details to be left unspoken.”
7. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 360 (Peter Laslett 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690):
And therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the 
ruling power ought to govern by declared and received 
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expressed in language, we value the English language’s capacity 
for precision, fine distinctions and common sense reasoning.
Vagueness is not just a legal phenomenon in Japan. It is at the 
core of the way Japanese individuals live and think, and this has 
been so for centuries.8 We who live in Japan have all had the 
experience of seeing two Japanese individuals in conversation, 
or on the telephone, and the body language that goes with it—the 
imparting of information not in complete sentences or 
paragraphs, but in dribs and drabs, the nodding, the grunts and 
laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined 
resolutions: for then mankind will be in a far worse condition 
than in the state of nature, if they shall have armed one, or a 
few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to 
obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their 
sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment 
unknown wills, without having any measures set down which 
may guide and justify their actions: for all the power the 
government has, being only for the good of the society, as it 
ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be 
exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the 
people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the 
limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, 
and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to 
employ it to such purposes, and by such measures, as they 
would not have known, and own not willingly. (alteration in 
original).
See also FREDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, THE 
DEFINITIVE EDITION (Malcolm Hamowy, ed) 315 (2011) (“The second chief 
attribute that must be required of true laws is that they be known and certain.”).
8. MURASAKI SHIKIBU, THE TALE OF GENJI 978 (Arthur Waley trans., 
1929) (1021) For example the dialogue in The Tale of Genji (978?) is marked 
by constant indirection and ambiguity: 
I could not pretend I had not heard. I had however no intention 
of prolonging my visit, particularly as the odour was now
becoming definitely unpleasant, and looking cross I recited the 
acrostic “On this night marked by the strange behaviour of the 
spider, how foolish to bid me come back tomorrow” and 
calling over my shoulder “There is no excuse for you!” I ran 
out of the room. But she, following me, “If night by night and 
every night we met, in daytime too I should grow bold to meet 
you face to face.” Here in the second sentence she had 
cleverly concealed the meaning, “If I had had any reason to 
expect you, I should not have eaten garlic.
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other sound effects, the constant feedback from the listener to the 
speaker confirming that the listener has understood and is on the 
same wave length at each download of a mini-packet of data 
along the way. You can spot two Japanese in conversation at 
fifty paces in O’Hare Airport or a restaurant in Paris and know 
immediately that they are Japanese.9
Why don’t Japanese speak in complete sentences, much less 
complete paragraphs? Well, one part of it is that the Japanese 
language itself is inherently rather vague and can give rise to 
misunderstandings unless the speaker repeatedly confirms with 
the listener what he is actually trying to say or who he is talking 
about (as we know, definite articles don’t exist, and subjects and 
objects of sentences are more often than not merely implied).10
But looming behind the language is Japanese culture itself, 
and the historical context from which both the language and 
culture emerge. Japanese have been conversing in the same 
tentative way for hundreds of years. They are conditioned not to 
take the risk of “coming out” with what they “really think” 
unless they can be sure it will be acceptable to their audience.
The speaker doesn’t want to offend or make an enemy or say the 
wrong thing. Japanese reveal their true meanings bit by bit, and 
in ways that are deliberately vague, to provide cover if it turns 
out they are veering into disagreement or other dangerous 
territory. The language is loaded with euphemisms, evasions and 
9. EDWIN O. REISCHAUER & MARIUS B. JANSEN, THE JAPANESE TODAY
136 (1995):
To operate their group system successfully, the Japanese have 
found it advisable to avoid open confrontations. Varying 
positions are not sharply outlined and their differences 
analyzed and clarified. Instead each participant in a discussion 
feels his way cautiously, unfolding his own views only as he 
sees how others react to them. Much is suggested by 
indirection or vague implication. Thus any sharp conflict of 
views is avoided before it comes into the open.
10. TAKEYOSHI KAWASHIMA, Ho-shakaigaku Jojetsu [Introduction to 
the Sociology of Law], in KAWASHIMA TAKEYOSHI CHOSAKU-SHU [COLLECTED 
WORKS OF TAKEYOSHI KAWASHIMA] (1982); TAKAYESHO KWASHIMA,
NIHONJIN NO GENGO ISHIKI TO HORITSU [LAW AND THE LINGUISTIC 
CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE JAPANESE] 382 (1979).
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indirections. Statements are couched in conditional, tentative 
moods. Speakers are subtly pressured to shape their message to 
meet the expectations of their audience, to reach a fuzzy middle 
ground of consensus.11 At some level the notion of “what I really 
think” or “what I really believe” is vague, contextual and 
negotiable for most Japanese.12
Japanese vagueness is a natural outgrowth and corollary of 
the way Japanese society has been organized for many centuries: 
a society based on tightly integrated hierarchical groups -
families, villages, clans - that demanded near absolute loyalty, 
obedience and trust and the suppression of individuality, in 
exchange for identity and protection. Within the homogenous in-
group to which one belongs, common understandings, 
assumptions and values are so deeply shared that they hardly 
need talking or thinking about. There is little self-reflection, 
“critical thinking,” or debate. Instead there is authority, status, 
kinship, tradition, custom. Conflicting interests, when they arise, 
are settled not by appeals to clearly articulated rules and 
principles, but by fuzzy compromise and consensus.13
11. REISCHAUER & JANSEN, supra note 9 at 381: 
[T]he Japanese, who commonly seek a cautious approach to 
consensus rather than a sharp clarification of differences of 
opinion—‘Let’s get down to brass tacks’—are more likely to 
cultivate vagueness of expression.
12. See RUTH BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD 219-
20 (First Mariner Books ed. 2005) (1946):
In Japan ‘respecting yourself’ is always to show yourself the
careful player. It does not mean, as it does in English usage,
consciously conforming to a worthy standard of conduct—not
truckling to another, not lying, not giving false testimony . . . . 
It had no implication, as it would in the United States, that 
even if thoughts are dangerous a man’s self-respect requires
that he think according to his own lights and his own
conscience.
13. REISCHAUER & JANSEN, supra note 9 at 136:
Consensus is the goal—a general agreement as to the sense of 
the meeting, to which no one continues to hold strong 
abjections. One-man decrees, regardless of that man’s 
authority, are resented, and even close majority decisions by 
vote leave the Japanese unsatisfied.
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Of course Japan is not the only society to have been 
organized this way. The same patterns can be seen in many pre-
modern, so-called “primitive” societies, which share with Japan 
“such institutional characteristics as weak government, 
ascription of rights on the basis of family membership and gift 
giving as a fundamental mode of exchange.”14 Japan’s 
distinctiveness, as elaborated in S. N. Eisenstadt’s masterful 
synthesis, “Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View”:
lies in its being the only non-Axial civilization that has 
maintained—throughout its history, up to the modern time—a
history of its own, without in some way being marginalized by 
the Axial civilizations, China and Korea, Confucianism and 
Buddhism, with which it was in continuous contact.15
Or, as Lafcadio Hearn put it at the turn of the last century, 
“Japan offers us the living spectacle of conditions older, and 
psychologically much farther away from us, than those of any 
Greek period with which art and literature have made us closely 
acquainted.”16 Eisenstadt and Hearn both affirm a Japanese 
uniqueness that rests upon ancient ways of thinking and feeling 
that have survived into modern times, and which have survived 
despite Japan’s exposure to all manner of foreign influences over 
the centuries.
I have found Eisenstadt’s distinction between “Axial” and 
“non-Axial” civilizations, based on an idea originally developed 
by Karl Jaspers17, to be particularly helpful in characterizing the 
essential differences between Western and Japanese mentalities 
in general, and the key differences in their conceptions of law 
14. RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 150 (1981).
15. S. N. EISENSTADT, JAPANESE CIVILIZATION: A COMPARATIVE VIEW
14 (1996). As articulated by Eisenstadt, and by German philosopher Karl 
Jaspers, the Axial Age – from roughly 800 to 200 BCE - represents a period of 
breakthrough intellectual thought, philosophy and religion, which, somehow, 
emerges nearly simultaneously in the Far East (China), the Near East (Persia 
and Israel), South Asia (India), and in the West (Greece).
16. HEARN, supra note 3, at 17.
17. KARL JASPERS, THE ORIGIN AND GOAL OF HISTORY 1953.
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and rights in particular. As Eisenstadt explains it, Axial 
civilizations grew out of an intellectual breakthrough 
exemplified by: the Old Testament prophets; Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle; and the teachings of Confucius, Buddha and Jesus 
Christ.
According to Eisenstadt, the essence of this phenomenon is 
attributable to major changes and transformations in human 
thinking, in the perceived relationship between cause and effect, 
in basic cultural conceptions of society and the individual self 
(i.e., whether the individual will be shaped primarily by the 
familial and societal environment or on the basis of the 
individual’s own independent and autonomous ideas and 
beliefs), and in the development of revolutionary new theories of 
human life and existence - all of which produced profound 
intellectual breakthroughs which irrevocably changed the course 
of human history. The heart of the Axial “syndrome,” according 
to Eisenstadt, was the interaction of two contrary “tendencies.”
The first involved the manner in which nature and the 
possibilities of reality were to be understood (i.e., between 
mundane and transcendental dimensions, to use a controversial 
formulation), and the prodigious quantities of intellectual vigor 
and critical thinking that such sophisticated new ways of 
thinking required. This was coupled with an increasing focus on
radical new insights about the cosmos and the nature of time, 
about the possibility of realities beyond the one into which we 
are born to live our brief lives, and about the complex 
relationship between the individual, the social order, and the 
infinite.
The second was the transformation of so many historical 
aspects of social activities and organizations arising from kinship 
and territorial units or frameworks; and the concomitant 
development of “free” resources which can be organized or 
mobilized in different directions, giving rise to more complex 
social systems - thereby creating challenges to almost all pre-
existing institutional formations. However, these merging 
“tendencies” ultimately served to transform the nature of social 
organizations and of cultural orientations – as well as of 
individual thought - and it was their combination that created the 
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foundational possibility for the crystallization of the four main 
Axial Civilizations (i.e., China, India, Persia, and Greece), as 
well as for the global dissemination of their revolutionary 
insights (i.e., through the phenomena of: “reflexivity,” 
“disembeddment,” “ascriptive behavior,” “second order 
thinking,” and “problematization,” etc).18
At some point, the West underwent an intellectual revolution 
that Japan never did. The Old Testament vision that there is a 
“higher” law, a “higher” truth, “a world beyond our own” fed 
into Socrates (i.e., rationalism, science, truth for its own sake) 
and Jesus (i.e., everyone is your brother; your relationship to 
God is personal and individual; what profit is it to gain the whole 
world and yet lose your soul?). It was a mental leap that opened 
up possibilities beyond the immediate world as we know it, and 
it started the process of people thinking autonomously for 
themselves. It also led to dissatisfactions with the existing state 
of affairs - and to doubts about the legitimacy of the reigning 
political order, the social hierarchy, and received tradition and 
wisdom. By inviting people to ask “What if?” and “Why not?” it
accelerated the process of innovation and change. Directly 
relevant to the theme of this essay, this new way of thinking also 
led to a type of discourse that few Japanese are comfortable with 
even today: the debating of ideas and propositions “on the 
merits,” against a higher standard of objective facts and logical 
consistency, and independent of the debaters’ status or 
immediate personal interests. The search for a higher truth 
epitomized by the Socratic dialogues required a deeper level of 
mental and verbal clarity and precision. These were critical 
turning points in Western intellectual history that never 
penetrated Japan.19
18. S. N. EISENSTADT, AXIAL VISIONS AND AXIAL CIVILIZATIONS: THE 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF WORLD HISTORIES BETWEEN EVOLUTIONARY
TENDENCIES AND INSTITUTIONAL FORMATIONS 3 (2007), available at
www.humhonors.wiki.huji.ac.il/images/Axial_Age_(final)-86-1-.doc.
19. See Bjorn Wittrock, The Meaning of the Axial Age in AXIAL 
CIVILIZATIONS AND WORLD HISTORY, 78 (Johann P. Arnason, S. N. Eisenstadt 
& Bjorn Wittrock eds., 2005):
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Contrast the Parable of the Good Samaritan with Lafcadio 
Hearn’s description of Japanese attitudes towards strangers and 
banishment:
Under the feudal system there was incomparably less 
likelihood of sympathy for the stranger; and banishment 
signified hunger, solitude, and privation unspeakable. For be it 
remembered that the legal existence of the individual, at that 
period, ceased entirely outside of his relation to the family and 
to the commune. Everybody lived and worked for some 
household; every household for some clan; outside of the 
household, and the related aggregate of households, there was 
no life to be lived--except the life of criminals, beggars, and 
pariahs. . . . So the banished man was most often doomed to 
become a hinin,--one of that wretched class of wandering 
pariahs who were officially termed “not-men,” and lived by 
beggary, or by the exercise of some vulgar profession, such as 
that of ambulant musician or mountebank. We can scarcely 
imagine to-day the conditions of such banishment: to find a 
Western parallel we must go back to ancient Greek and 
Roman times long preceding the Empire. Banishment then 
signified religious excommunication, and practically 
expulsion from all civilized society,--since there yet existed no 
idea of human brotherhood, no conception of any claim except 
of kinship.20
The Parable of the Good Samaritan reflects a qualitatively 
different world view in which one is not only commanded to 
love one’s neighbor as oneself, but instructed that everyone - not 
[A] qualitative increase in reflexivity, historicality and 
agentiality is characteristic of the Axial Age and is the very 
premise for any reasoned distinction between political order 
and religious-cultural order and hence for the opening of the 
possibility of a challenge to cultural claims of legitimacy of 
political order. Once this possibility has been conceptually 
permitted, it is a potential that can never henceforth be 
“unthought,” i.e. the potential of a fundamental challenge of 
established order can never again be permanently removed.
20. HEARN supra note 3, at 98.
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just members of your immediate in-group - is your neighbor.21
(Interestingly, Jesus delivered the parable in response to a 
skeptical Pharisee who asked, “I know I am supposed to love my 
neighbor, but tell me just who is my neighbor?”—just the kind of 
adversarial discourse we identify with the Socratic method, and 
which the Japanese avoid at great pains.) In the parable are the 
seeds of what eventually became political liberalism—
individuals as individuals, distinct and independent from status 
and tribe, as the building block - the atom - of society, politics 
and the market. The parable is a precursor of the universalism 
that animates political liberalism and the ideal of the Rule of 
Law—political equality and equal application of the laws.22
As Hearn points out, terror of banishment is the flip-side of 
security in group identity. As they say in Japan, “deru kui wa 
utareru” (the nail that sticks out gets hammered down). The 
outspoken non-conformist, the questioner of received wisdom 
and authority, the voice crying in the wind, are typically 
shunned, cowed into silence, or expelled.23 The contrast with 
Socrates and Jesus, prototypes of Axial ways of thinking, is 
striking. Socrates and Jesus were manifestly nails who stuck out 
in the societies in which they lived and got hammered down.
Within the Axial context, the reason that Socrates and Jesus live 
on in collective memory is that their very martyrdom exposed 
the backwardness and illegitimacy of an older pre-Axial way of 
thinking that put them down, poisoned and crucified, 
respectively. In the Western mind they are heroes who represent 
our most fundamental values and ideals, including the very non-
Japanese value that those who question convention and tradition, 
or at least exercise their right to question, deserve respect and 
protection. Proclaiming your unconventional beliefs in the face 
21. Luke 10:25-37 (King James).
22. Ariel Knafo, et al., Helping Strangers is Lower in Embedded
Cultures, 40 J. OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 875-79 (2009), available at
http://jcc.sagepub.com/content/40/5/875.
23. See generally ALAN S. MILLER & SATOSHI KANAZAWA, ACCIDENT 
BY ORDER: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONFORMITY IN 
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN (2000).
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of authority - risking martyrdom in the name of a higher truth - is 
not the Japanese way. Japanese equivalents of a Socrates or 
Jesus (or St. Joan of Arc, or Sir Thomas More, or Galileo) are 
hard to find.24
If this contrast between the Axial West and non-Axial Japan 
is valid, it would be surprising if their ways of thinking about 
law, and the function of law in their respective societies, were 
not also fundamentally different in corresponding ways. It stands 
to reason that a society that thinks of hierarchical groups as the 
organic building block of society would tend to have a weaker 
sense of individual rights, and related concepts of equality and 
fairness. A community that thinks in terms of the immanent 
world of concrete here-and-now relationships and interests rather 
than transcendental “higher principles” and “higher truths” 
would tend to have a weaker reliance on what we call “rules” 
and “principles” in reaching legal decisions and resolving 
conflicts. A people for whom Socratic dialogue, debate and 
rhetoric are alien would tend to have a litigation style, judicial 
style, and legal academic style that are relatively less 
sophisticated (as it were) than those who have inherited Socratic 
traditions. Of course, this basic difference in orientation affects 
not only the Japanese legal system: it is endemic to all facets of 
life in Japan. It helps explain why, for example, Japanese politics 
are factional and largely non-ideological, why Japan has not 
produced a major figure in the realm of philosophy, and why a 
Japanese husband (or wife) tends to think about the problem of 
marital infidelity in a less principled and guilt-ridden way than a 
Christian.
24. BENEDICT, supra note 8:
In Japan ‘respecting yourself’ is always to show yourself the 
careful player. It does not mean, as it does in English usage, 
consciously conforming to a worthy standard of conduct—not 
truckling to another, not lying, not giving false testimony. . . 
.It had no implication, as it would in the United States, that 
even if thoughts are dangerous a man’s self-respect requires 
that he think according to his own lights and his own 
conscience.
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My thesis is that vagueness is the common and recurrent 
medium through which Japan resolves the basic categories of 
relationships and conflicts that are typically addressed by a legal 
system. Vagueness softens the hard edges of transcendent rules, 
rights and principles and pressures people with conflicting 
interests to resolve them in the old-fashioned Japanese way—
through the constant and ongoing dynamic of “human 
relationships,” compromise, consensus.25 In this sense it is 
antithetical to the liberal vision of the Rule of Law. In what 
follows, I will offer illustrations of vagueness at work in the two 
basic subdivisions of law: (1) the concept and reality of rights as 
between citizens and the state in the realm of public law; and (2) 
contract and property rights between private actors in the market.
II. VAGUENESS IN THE REALMS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW
A. Vague Boundaries between the State and Its Subjects
Our Western ideal of the Rule of Law is one in which the 
commands of the sovereign are expressed clearly in complete 
sentences and paragraphs, allowing citizens to plan their lives 
accordingly. As between the state and its citizens, we believe law 
ought to draw clear lines and boundaries. On one side, citizens 
may operate freely and without fear (i.e., you may burn the 
American flag with impunity, at least so long as you do not 
create a fire hazard). On the other, you act at your own risk and 
subject to conditions (i.e., if you drive you must wear a seat belt 
and not exceed the speed limit). If those boundaries are vague, 
the areas of life in which citizens can act freely and without fear 
are diminished. Vague boundaries put citizens in the position of 
having to obtain permission from the authorities before 
proceeding with a project or course of action, and invite arbitrary 
25. See SHUSAKU ENDO, Preface to SILENCE at xv (William Johnston
trans.)(1980). Shusaku Endo uses the metaphor of a “mudswamp” to describe 
collective Japanese consciousness, a wet environment in which Christianity 
and other Western ideologies quickly lose their shape and dissolve.
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and discriminatory granting of permissions and enforcement 
actions by the state.26
Conversely, clearly defined rights give individual citizens the 
ability to keep the state from intruding into protected areas of 
privacy, expression and autonomy. In this sense rights and 
individualism are closely linked, thematically and historically.
Rights enable individuals to stand up in the face of authority, the 
majority, the community, the in-group-- and say “Hands off” (or 
less polite variants thereof). Clearly defined rights allow one to 
be the nail that sticks out and not fear the consequences. Rights 
are designed to make it safe to do something very un-Japanese.
In the Western liberal model, constitutionally protected 
individual rights, enforced by an independent judiciary, are 
supposed to be the first line of defense protecting individual 
citizens from the state. In sharp contrast to the U.S., 
constitutional law, litigation and jurisprudence in Japan have 
never had a meaningful impact on any aspect of Japanese civic 
or social life. Not only has Japan’s Supreme Court famously 
hesitated to overturn statutes or other state action on 
constitutional grounds, but more fundamentally it has 
persistently avoided articulating constitutional rights as such.27
26. VON HAYEK, supra note 7, at 199-214.
27. See David S. Law, Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial
Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545, 1547 (2009):
Since its creation in 1947, the court known in Japanese as the
Saikǀ Saibansho has struck down only eight statutes on 
constitutional grounds . . . . The majority of the SCJ’s rulings
of unconstitutionality have, moreover, been less than 
momentous. Among the rare and often obscure legislative 
provisions that the Court has struck down are a law punishing
patricide more severely than other forms of homicide, a law
restricting the ability of pharmacies to operate within close
physical proximity of one another, a rule limiting the liability 
of the postal service for the loss of registered mail, a law 
restricting the ability of co-owners of forest land to subdivide
their property, and, most recently, a statutory provision that 
distinguished for purposes of citizenship eligibility between
illegitimate children of Japanese fathers who acknowledged
paternity prior to birth and those whose fathers acknowledged
paternity only subsequent to birth(footnote omitted).
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In the Western liberal tradition, “balancing tests” and sliding 
scales of “scrutiny” aside, rights have a supra-political, non-
negotiable, absolute quality. By contrast, in Japanese 
constitutional jurisprudence, rights are typically conceived from 
the start in relative terms.
The long line of Japanese electoral district apportionment 
cases illustrates the point. Migration from rural to urban areas 
has created sharp disparities, in favor of the rural areas, between 
population and the number of seats assigned to Japanese 
electoral districts for both houses of the Diet. Since the 1960s, 
voters from underrepresented urban districts have brought 
constitutional challenges to malapportionment under Article 14, 
the Japanese equivalent of the equal protection clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court had no difficulty finding an 
effectively absolute right to “one man-one vote” in the Equal 
Protection Clause: “The Equal Protection Clause requires that a 
State make an honest and good faith to construct districts, in both 
houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as 
possible.”28 Based on this clear principle U.S. courts have flatly 
invalidated all but very minor (i.e., one or two percentage points) 
and temporary deviations from the one man-one vote ideal. The 
constitutional requirement is simple and does not demand
extended contemplation: “equal” means “equal.”
The Japanese Supreme Court, on the other hand, has 
struggled mightily, by means of vague, evolving and relativistic 
doctrines, to prevent a one man-one vote right from coming into 
existence. Initially, in the 1960’s, the Supreme Court invoked 
something resembling the “political question” doctrine and 
declared that apportionment was categorically within the 
discretion of the Diet.29 However, in the 1970s, as the degree of 
disparity between rural and urban districts widened, the Court 
reassessed its earlier position and stated that disparities could 
28. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
29. Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 5, 1964, no. 18 Saikǀ Saibansho
Minji Hanreishǌ [Minshǌ] 270 (Japan).
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indeed violate Article 14 if they were overly “extreme.”30 The 
Court suggested that, depending on whether the upper house or 
lower house were involved, a discrepancy in voting power of 
somewhere between 3:1 and 6:1 would be “extreme” and 
therefore unconstitutional. At the same time the Court said that it 
did not have the power to overturn the results of past elections, 
meaning the newly recognized constitutional right (i.e., one man-
at least 1/6 to 1/3 of a full vote) effectively lacked a remedy. The 
Supreme Court has inconclusively meandered on the 
apportionment problem to the present day.
The Court’s handling of the apportionment problem illustrates 
the Japanese proclivity to blur and render relative what we would 
view as categorical. The “political question” doctrine, which the 
Court initially invoked to avoid resolving the apportionment 
problem, is itself categorical: a defined category of legislative 
action (e.g., apportionment of electoral districts) either is or is 
not subject to second-guessing by the judiciary. The “one man-
one vote” principle is also categorical: there is no middle ground, 
either votes are equal or they are not. The Japanese Supreme 
Court, however, treats both as matters of degree somehow to be 
traded off against one another:
The equality of the value of votes should be understood to be 
achieved in harmony with other policy goals and grounds such 
as the uniqueness of the Upper House which Parliament may 
legitimately take into consideration. Therefore, insofar as a 
specific decision of Parliament is justifiable as a reasonable 
exercise of its discretionary power, even if the equality of the 
value of the vote is affected by this, it is not unconstitutional.31
One strongly suspects that the Japanese courts, from the 
beginning, treated the apportionment problem not as a straight 
30. Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 1976, Showa 79 (gyo-tsu) no. 
75, 30 Saikǀ Saibansho Minji Hanreishǌ [Minshǌ] 223, http://www.courts.go.jp 
(Japan).
31. Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Oct. 17, 2012, Heisei 23 (gyo-tsu) no.
51, 66 Saikǀ Saibansho Minji Hanreishǌ [Minshǌ] 10, http://www.courts.go.jp 
(Japan).
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constitutional question but as a political one, to be solved 
incrementally, with the Court itself serving as one of the parties 
sitting at a larger table of interests. One also senses the Supreme 
Court (reflecting the man in the street) was not overly concerned 
about preserving the categorical principle of individual equality 
underlying (and logically requiring) one man-one vote. The issue 
was instead viewed in terms of group interests: urban vs. rural 
districts, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”)(the prime 
beneficiary of skewed representation in favor of rural districts) 
vs. the left-leaning political parties supported by urban 
constituencies. The Supreme Court’s apportionment cases are 
models of muddy jurisprudence and strategic vagueness that 
have had the effect of nudging the LDP over time to reapportion 
electoral seats in a way that has kept discrepancies in voting 
power from becoming too outrageous. In Japan, constitutional 
adjudication often looks and feels a lot like more like ad hoc 
conciliation than a principled determination of rights and wrongs 
on the merits.
The Japanese Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause cases 
evince the same tendency to treat rights as floating targets that 
move relative to political context. The Japanese Supreme Court 
essentially imported the already vague “purpose and effect” test 
of Lemon v. Kurtzman32 from the United States and proceeded to 
apply an even vaguer version on an ad hoc basis to a variety of 
factual situations in which the government or its representatives 
were arguably promoting religion.33 The decisions, individually 
and collectively, fail to articulate any convincing or consistent 
standard. The absence of a standard, in turn, facilitates an 
implicit balancing of interests by the court in a way that usually 
32. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). (Holding that a U.S. law 
must have a legitimate secular purpose - and must not have the primary effect 
of either advancing or inhibiting religion or of fostering an excessive 
entanglement of government and religion - in order to be a constitutionally 
permissible law under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution).
33. Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct], July 13, 1977, (gyo-tsu) No. 69, 31-34
Saikǀ Saibansho Minji Hanreishǌ [Minshǌ] 533, http://www.courts.go.jp 
(Japan).
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produces a cautious ratification of the government’s action.34
The Court’s refusal to articulate a standard allows it to finesse an 
awkward reality, namely that the parties to the lawsuits (like 
most Japanese) are apathetic about religion and religious issues 
as such and are merely using the Establishment Clause (lifted as-
is from the U.S. Constitution and imposed on Japan by the 
Occupation) to score political points.
In many cases, issues that would, outside of Japan, be fraught 
with constitutional significance are resolved entirely out of court 
through negotiation and consensus among affected interest 
groups. Take pornography. Obviously, defining pornography is a 
slippery topic, and the boundaries are inherently murky, not just 
in Japan but universally. In Japan, the boundary has been defined 
not in the way we would expect under a conventional Rule of 
Law regime—by the legislature or by the Supreme Court—but in 
a series of negotiations between the police and the publishing 
industry. In 1991, on the occasion of the publication of a 
collection of nude photographs of Kanako Higuchi under the title 
“Water Fruit,” the police and the publishing industry reached an 
informal accord that female pubic hair, but not more, would be 
the working dividing line.35 As such, the pubic hair standard is 
not particularly vague. But it does not constitute a formal legal 
right; the police are always theoretically free to revise what they 
will enforce. What does remain vague is how far beyond that line 
one could go and still be protected under Article 21 of the 
Constitution. It is hard to imagine a Japanese Larry Flynt 
pushing the constitutional envelope by daring the authorities to 
34. For a review of the Japanese Establishment Clause cases see Brent 
T. White, Re-Examining Separation: The Construction of Separation of
Religion and State in Post-War Japan, 22 UCLA PAC BASIN L.J. 29 (2004).
35. SATOSHI MISHIMA, SEI HYOUGEN NO KEIJI KISEI-
AMERIKA GASSHUKOKU NI OKERU KISEI NO REKISHITEKI 
KOUSATSU (The Criminal Regulation of Sexual Expression—A
Consideration of the Historical Background of Regulation in America) 183-84
(2007). An account of the proceedings is reported in the September 19, 1993 
Sandei Mainichi magazine.
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arrest and prosecute him. It is not the Japanese way and would 
not turn out well.36
In a separate realm, the relationship between regulatory 
agencies of the government and the subjects of regulation is 
delineated by a combination of fuzzy rules, on the one hand, and 
painfully detailed but hard-to-understand regulations, on the 
other, that encourage the regulated to consult with the authorities
on an ongoing basis. The regulated ignore unsolicited 
“administrative guidance” at their own risk, for the authorities 
have multiple means of recourse and influence beyond the 
official sanctions contained in statutes and published 
regulations.37 The regulated are in a “long term” relationship 
36. It is true that the dividing line between obscenity and “mere”
indecency is universally difficult to draw and the US Supreme Court has 
struggled over the years to define the precise dividing line. The significant 
difference between the US and Japanese approaches to pornography is not in 
the dividing line itself, but in the nature of the larger doctrinal framework and 
methodology. In the US, the constitutionality of regulating obscenity is part of 
an overarching doctrine that divides the universe of expression into “core”
protected areas and others, including obscenity, that are accorded a lower level 
of protection. Regulation of “core” speech must pass a series of interrelated 
hurdles, e.g. that the regulation serve a “compelling” state interest, that it be 
“content neutral,” neither “over” nor “under-inclusive;” and that it be 
“narrowly tailored” to achieve the asserted state interest. The US Supreme 
Court, despite the inherent murkiness of the dividing line, has tried the 
articulate standards that are as precise as the material will allow: “The basic 
guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether ‘the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken 
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by 
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The Supreme Court has also addressed issues such as 
whether the relevant standard should be a national or local one, and the 
separation of powers consequences were the Court to abdicate its role as arbiter 
of what constitutes obscenity. By comparison, the larger framework of First 
Amendment doctrine in Japan is starkly primitive. Further, the specific issue of 
pornography has been resolved wholly outside the courts without the benefit of 
any doctrinal analysis.
37. The Lions Sekiyuu incident, in which the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) used “administrative guidance” to shut down 
otherwise legal imports of cheap imported petro-fuels by a maverick importer 
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with their regulators, with debits and credits, favors given and 
received, misdeeds punished and overlooked, toted up and 
reckoned over the years. The practice of amakudari, sinecures 
for post-retirement government officials in private companies, 
further blurs the line between the roles and interests of regulators 
and the regulated. Uncertainty over rules and boundaries 
encourages companies in regulated industries to maintain formal 
and informal industry associations through which they exchange 
information and otherwise obtain the benefit of safety in 
numbers – a practical arrangement which often appears far more 
important than actual compliance with the law. Relying on the 
law and lawyers to navigate the regulatory thicket is a futile 
enterprise. It is no accident that the Japanese equivalent of the 
Washington-style “regulatory lawyer” has never developed, 
except perhaps to serve foreign businesses unable to play the 
game by the local rules. More often than not, the foreigners 
discover than their Japanese regulatory lawyers cannot give 
reliable advice without first placing a telephone call or making a 
visit to the agency in question (i.e., what is paramount is not so 
much what the law itself actually states, but rather what the 
regulator states).
In this humid regulatory environment, consistency in the
application of rules takes a backseat to ongoing interest group 
accommodation. Take pachinko. Gambling is illegal in Japan 
(subject to specifically legislated exceptions such as the national 
lottery and government-operated race tracks).38 Pachinko enjoys 
no legislative exemption, but in fact about 12,000 pachinko 
parlors are openly and notoriously in operation in Japan, seeming 
to indicate that pachinko is legal. Pachinko is de facto legal—but 
not so legal that the Financial Services Agency will allow 
pachinko operators to issue securities in the Japanese market 
(based merely on unwritten policy). You will have a hard time 
obtaining a legal opinion from a reputable law firm vouching 
are emblematic of the extra-legal nature of “administrative guidance.” See
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 31, 1984; Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun; January 
11, 1985.
38. K(,+ƿ[K(,+ƿ] [PEN C.] art. 185-187 (Japan).
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that it is legal. Pachinko’s legality depends on a flimsy legal 
fiction that requires the steel balls to be traded for trinkets in the 
parlor itself, and the trinkets to be traded for cash at a separate 
window in the dark alley behind the parlor. The fiction is that it’s 
not “illegal gambling’ because nothing of economic value is 
being given in the parlor itself, but only in the dark alley behind 
the parlor. The fiction is not written officially anywhere, does 
not constitute a formal legal right of any kind; it is simply an 
understanding between the police and the pachinko industry, just 
like the understanding between the police and the publishing 
industry on pubic hair. The fact that former policemen typically 
own and operate the back alley cash windows, and the pachinko 
industry’s historical connections with the domestic Korean 
community and the underworld, are additional factors in the 
accommodation that has formed organically over the years. Like 
much else, pachinko’s legality is a matter of degree.
Western casino companies eager to introduce Las Vegas-style 
casino to Japan have sometimes naively asked whether the same 
legal fiction that makes pachinko possible could be applied it in 
a broader and more general way. What if we limited prizes in 
casinos to plastic poker chips that could be traded for cash at a 
separate window in the back alley? If the fiction works for 
pachinko, it should work for roulette and black jack as well, 
right? Answer: No. There is no legally satisfying reason for this 
answer. As a matter of fact and practice it is very clear the police 
will shut down a casino even if it employs the same fiction used 
in the pachinko industry. The casino industry has not yet cut its 
deal with the police or other institutions and interests with a say 
in the matter.
The quasi-legal status of pachinko echoes the accommodation 
Japan has made with organized crime. The paradoxical legal 
status of the yakuza is enshrined in the Organized Crime 
Countermeasures Law39, enacted in 1991, which requires 
criminal organizations that are engaged in specified illegal acts 
39. %ǀU\RNXGDQ-LQQL\RUX)XWǀQD.ǀLQR%ǀVKL7ǀQLNDQVXUX+ǀULWVX
[Law to Prevent Illegal Activities by Members of Criminal Organizations], 
Law No. 77 of 1991 (Japan).
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of violence and intimidation formally to register with the 
authorities. The law has the perverse effect of formally 
recognizing, almost licensing, organized criminal organizations 
which, by the very act of registering, admit they are chronically 
guilty of violent crimes while being allowed to continue in 
existence. The authorities have never tried to shut down 
organized crime, the shadow of which touches large areas of 
everyday economic and social life. At best the authorities try to 
keep organized crime “under control,” within “reasonable 
bounds” by means of episodic crackdowns. Organized crime 
thrives where the official legal system is weak, and people need 
“private enforcement” of promises and “private protection” of 
physical security that the official system is failing to provide. Is 
organized crime in Japan legal? Like pachinko, it is a matter of 
degree.
The related prosecutions of Yoshiaki Murakami (for insider 
trading) and Takafumi Horie (for securities fraud) in 2007 
illustrate in yet another context the elevation of vague consensus 
over a more explicit, “disembedded” application of articulated 
rules. Japanese prosecutors arrested and prosecuted Murakami 
and Horie in order to nip in the bud American-style corporate 
raiding techniques that the two threatened to introduce in Japan.
The Japanese corporate establishment collectively panicked at 
the prospect of hostile takeovers by foreign funds and domestic 
upstarts like Murakami and Horie, which in turn set in motion a 
counter-reaction within all three branches of the government to 
“do something” to shut down the threat.40
The Murakami and Horie prosecutions were the result, not of 
an independent prosecutorial decision to go after wrong-doers 
for specific criminal infractions that were clear and serious in 
and of themselves, but a collective decision to send a message 
for perceived reasons of policy. One imagines a series of 
40. For a detailed account of the background to the Murakami and 
Horie prosecutions see Stephen Givens, Looking Through the Wrong End of the 
Telescope: The Japanese Response to Steel Partners, Murakami and Horie, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1571 (2011).
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meetings and conversations between and among bureaucrats and 
company executives in the period 2005 – 2007 in and around 
Kasumigaseki in which the implicit conclusion is reached that 
“Horie and Murakami are bad people and bad for the country.” 
This consensus led, in one direction, to informal cooperation 
between the bureaucracy and courts to send a green light to the 
corporate establishment to adopt defensive “poison pills,”
despite the fact that the technical legal basis for poison pills 
under Japanese law was dubious and remains so today.
On the prosecutorial front, lost in the shuffle and haste was a 
reasoned analysis of what was offensively criminal about the 
defendants actual conduct or who had actually been harmed.
Unable to find any basis to indict Horie for his attempt to acquire 
the shares of Nippon Broadcasting, the activity that most upset 
the corporate establishment, the prosecutors dug further back in 
history and indicted him for misleading accounting in the 
financial statements of his company, Livedoor. Without going 
into details here, the accounting transgression was highly 
technical in nature and one that had been blessed by Livedoor’s 
accounting firm. It is difficult to avoid the impression that the 
prosecutors, intent on putting Horie out of business, kept digging 
until they found something.
Murakami inadvertently tripped over the insider trading 
statute when he encouraged Horie to launch a hostile bid against 
Nippon Broadcasting, got a positive response from Horie, and 
continued trading Nippon Broadcasting stock after he had a 
pretty good idea Horie was going to initiate a tender offer: the 
insider trading statute prohibits trading by a person who has 
knowledge that a third party is about to launch a tender offer bid 
(“TOB”). Murakami’s trading may have violated the literal 
words of the statute, but anyone who understood the actual 
business context could see that no one was harmed by 
Murakami’s trading. Nippon Broadcasting’s stock had already
been pushed up by Murakami’s own highly public accumulation 
of a large stake in the company and the common knowledge that 
someone—Nippon Broadcasting’s majority owner Fuji 
Television being a likely candidate—was likely to launch a 
takeover bid any day.
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Like the legality of pachinko, pornography and organized 
crime, the criminal guilt of Murakami and Horie was also a 
matter of degree. Murakami and Horie may arguably have been 
guilty of technical violations of the criminal statutes under which 
they were charged, but those infractions were convenient 
pretexts, and not the real reason they were indicted and put out 
of business.
The Japanese aversion to settling conflicts on the legal merits, 
as opposed to a foggier give-and-take among the interests seated 
at the table, often works the other way and keeps the state from 
taking action clearly within its legal authority. Take the 
government’s weak and indecisive efforts to acquire the land to 
build Narita International Airport. The government reluctantly 
invoked its powers of eminent domain41 only after years of 
inconclusive negotiation with local farmers, and promptly 
foreswore ever again to exercise eminent domain in Narita when 
formal eminent domain proceedings led to further local protest.
The authorities’ hesitation to remove encroachments on public 
property and other forms of public nuisances - encampments of 
the homeless in public parks, or of anti-nuclear activists in 
Kasumigaseki; loudspeaker trucks, illegal parking, real estate 
and escort service ads plastered on telephone poles - arises from 
the same mentality: wherever possible, conflicts should be 
resolved not by invocation of rights and rules but face-to-face, 
case-by-case, give-and-take among the parties in interest. This 
works reasonably well when the parties in interest are “good” 
people receptive to unwritten social expectations. One of the side 
effects, however, is to give disproportionate power to recalcitrant 
minorities, hold-outs, gangsters and other “bad” people less 
driven by the good opinion of others.
41. Article 29, paragraph 3 of the Japanese Constitution provides: 
“Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation 
therefor.” NIHONKOKU K(13ƿ [K(13ƿ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 29, para. 2 
(Japan).
864 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
B. Vagueness in the Realm of Contract and other Private 
Rights
The Japanese tendency to subordinate formal rights to the 
practical calculus of “human relationships” naturally and 
seamlessly extends to private transactions and conflicts.
Takeyoshi Kawashima, Japan’s best-known scholar of Japanese 
“legal consciousness,” illustrates the point with a story about a 
farmer who agrees to set aside some potatoes for a resident of a 
neighboring village.42 When the “promisee” arrives to buy the 
potatoes, the farmer sadly informs him that he has sold the 
potatoes to someone from his own village who needed them 
more. In the farmer’s mind this is a more than sufficient 
justification for his “breach of contract,” because his moral 
obligations to members of his own village trump the “contract 
rights” of a relative outsider. Kawashima goes on to explain this 
outcome in sociological terms that are consistent with my earlier 
evocation of Japan as a non-Axial civilization. The Western 
concept of contract, he explains, reflecting the universalistic 
tendencies of Western thinking in general, assumes that 
autonomous and equal individuals, disconnected from their 
social status and relationship, are the parties to a contract. In the 
Western mind, contracts and contracts rights are an “all or 
nothing” matter; contract rights either exist, or don’t, and if they 
exist are enforced in accordance with their terms. In Japan, on 
the other hand, contract rights are not viewed in isolation as 
absolute and fixed, but are viewed in relative terms against a 
larger context of multiple interests, relationships and 
circumstances. This sociological interpretation of Japanese 
contract rights is commonplace and uncontroversial within the 
Japanese academic community.
The Japanese prefer their contracts short and vague.43 To a 
Westerner the whole point of a contract is to “lock in” a set of 
42. NIHONJIN NO HO ISHIKI, supra note 10, at 296-297.
43. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato take seeming exception to 
this banal assertion: “Their contracts are not necessarily vague. Neither are they 
necessarily short.” They go on to argue that if Japanese commercial contracts 
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outcomes against future risks and contingencies, to define up 
front who bears the cost and burden when things go wrong down 
the line. This concept of contract is antithetical to Japanese 
instincts. The Japanese strongly prefer to postpone the question 
of who bears the burden, and to resolve the question through 
“consultation” and “good faith negotiation” if and when the 
future contingency actually occurs. Vagueness hard-wired into 
contracts dilutes vested rights and throws the parties back to the 
evolving context of their relationships. This works well enough 
when the contract parties are tied into long term relationships 
and share a common world-view, as is almost always the case 
when the contract parties are both Japanese. It works out less 
reliably when one of the contract parties is foreign and therefore 
less susceptible to the full range of extra-contractual moral and 
commercial pressures and obligations (i.e., giri) that help 
determine the outcome of these “consultations.” Requiring a 
foundation of pre-existing trust between the parties before 
engaging in a transaction beneficially reduces the need to rely on 
contracts; the unfortunate corollary for Japanese businesses in a 
global economy is that making trust a precondition to entering 
into a transaction radically limits the universe of available 
transaction parties, essentially to other like-minded Japanese 
businesses.44
are indeed shorter, it is because the Japanese judicial system is more 
professional than its counterpart in the US and therefore more predictable; not 
because Japanese companies tend to work things out in the context of long term 
relationships. Their use of the word “necessarily” and the follow-up
explanation of why Japanese commercial contracts are shorter and vaguer (as to 
which I will not comment here) seem to concede the point however. MARK 
RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
61 (1999).
44. See HEARN, supra note 3, at 392-2:
Thus, in every direction, the individual finds himself 
confronted by the despotism of collective opinion: it is 
impossible for him to act with safety except as one unit a 
combination. The first kind of pressure deprives him of moral 
freedom, exacting unlimited obedience to orders; the second 
kind of pressure denies him the right to use his best faculties 
in the best way for his own advantage (that is to say, denies 
him the right of free competition); the third kind of pressure 
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Japanese civil litigation behavior has been at the center of the 
effort by Western (mainly American) legal scholars to debunk 
cultural explanations of the Japanese legal system, and so 
warrants careful attention. I will address continuing reaction 
within the small world of foreign scholars of Japanese law 
against anthropology and history in favor of “institutional” 
explanations for Japanese behavior in the final section of this 
essay. For the time being, I will briefly describe how vagueness 
operates in the context of Japanese civil litigation.
Litigation is where law hits the pavement (or plows into a 
telephone pole). As I have argued, Japanese law itself is vague, 
in the sense that rights and rules tend to be defined in a fuzzy, 
relativistic way. Because judicial decisions are low in volume 
(reflecting low litigation volume) and typically short on explicit 
legal reasoning, a reading of the relevant statutes and case law 
will not generate enough information cleanly to resolve the legal 
positions of parties in the context of a given set of litigation 
facts. In many fact-specific cases (and most cases are highly 
fact-dependent) Japanese law is “gray.” Of course, the law is 
“gray” outside of Japan as well; lawyers and litigation exist 
precisely because of the “gray” areas. The scale and granularity 
of the gray areas, and how they are argued and resolved, 
however, are very different across jurisdictions.
Here is a real world example: A component supplied by an 
insured manufacturer under a standard General Liability Policy 
is incorporated into a larger piece of equipment manufactured by 
compels him, in directing the actions of others, to follow 
tradition, to forbear innovations, to avoid making any changes, 
however beneficial, which do not find willing acceptance on 
the part of his inferiors. These are the social conditions, which, 
under normal circumstances, make for stability, for 
conservation; and they represent the will of the dead. They are 
inevitable to a militant state; they make the strength of that 
state; they render facile the creation and maintenance of 
formidable armies. But they are not conditions favorable to 
success in the future international competition,--in the 
industrial struggle for existence against societies incomparably 
more plastic, and of higher mental energy.
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the insured’s customer. The component malfunctions and has to 
be replaced. It is feasible to repair and replace the component, 
but cheaper simply to scrap the larger piece of equipment 
(including the bad component) and start from scratch. Issue: The 
General Liability Policy excludes coverage of damage to the 
insured’s “own equipment”—i.e., loss of or damage to the bad 
component itself is not covered. Damage to the larger equipment 
can be avoided simply by replacing the bad component.
However, replacement is uneconomic. In these circumstances, 
does the insurance policy cover the component manufacturer for 
the value of scrapped equipment if the equipment manufacturer 
(reasonably) decides to scrap and not replace? Does it make a
difference if the component cannot be replaced without 
physically damaging the equipment to which it is attached? Does 
it make any difference whether scrapping is only slightly cheaper 
than replacement, as opposed to a lot cheaper?
Researching this interesting issue under American law using 
Westlaw or Lexis generates literally dozens if not hundreds of 
cases interpreting and applying the relevant provisions of the 
standard General Liability Policy over many decades in all 
manner of factual contexts, based on parsing of the relevant 
policy language, prior precedent and various public policy 
considerations. There are analogous cases involving defective 
window sashes and air conditioning systems incorporated into 
larger structures that cannot be repaired and replaced without in 
some way damaging the larger structure. There are other cases 
involving packets of rancid peanut butter incorporated into a 
cardboard kit of peanut butter cookie ingredients (the bad peanut 
butter packets could be replaced by opening and destroying the 
box), almond butter containing wood chips (that could 
theoretically be removed by painstaking use of tweezers).
Beyond the sheer mass and density of precedent, the fabric and 
meta-rules of “legal reasoning” in the judicial opinions evinces a 
Western, or at least Anglo-American, “legal consciousness.” 
Precedent is applied to the facts in a deliberate, explicit and 
conscious way. Judges give reasons, make logical distinctions, 
reconcile tensions and contradictions, refer to underlying 
policies, deliver conclusions and dissenting opinions, and so on, 
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in a manner that traces its roots back to Socrates and the thinking 
habits and style inculcated in law school.
By contrast, researching the same question under Japanese 
law produces virtually no helpful precedent. It is not just that 
precedents are few. More critically, the Japanese precedents do 
not contain articulated principles and concepts that help orient 
one’s thinking on the issue at hand. The precedents reveal which 
side won but are otherwise intellectually void. Precedent is 
referred to only in rare cases. Reasoning is bland and conclusory.
Dissents are rare. The same holds true across all areas of law, 
including constitutional law. Judicial opinions are the core texts 
of American legal education because they embody the essence of 
our traditions of thinking about legal issues. Casebooks of 
Japanese judicial opinions, on the other hand, are little used in 
Japanese legal education and take a back seat to dry academic 
articles and books by university professors in shaping legal 
doctrine. Japanese judicial opinions are simply not intellectually 
dynamic, crisp or substantive enough either to serve as 
educational texts or as reliable guides for structuring the issues in 
actual cases. These intellectual differences are deep-seated and 
reappear across multiple disciplines, not just the way judicial 
opinions are written but just as much in the way newspaper 
editorials, speeches on the floor of the legislature and scholarly 
articles are constructed.
Unlike U.S. courts, Japanese courts almost never cite, 
describe, distinguish, etc., other cases. In the U.S. you expect a 
court facing a case where the precedents don’t give a clear 
answer to go through the precedents, describe what was at stake, 
summarize the reasons the earlier courts gave, etc. This is the 
methodology of the common law. Japanese courts do consult 
precedents but they don’t tell the reader which ones they 
consulted, what the cases said or how the cases logically or 
otherwise affected the reasoning and outcome of the case at 
hand. The fact that Japanese courts don’t have to put their cards 
on the table by citing specific precedent means that in practice 
they are free to ignore precedent and frequently do, as they are 
practically unconstrained by the historical legal connections that 
link one case to another.
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The line of cases on the so-called “Japanese poison pill” 
culminating in the Bulldog Sauce case are illustrative. Prior to 
2005, Japanese case law held consistently that a company could 
not issue stock or stock rights if the “primary purpose” was to 
thwart a takeover. This case law stood in the way of the poison 
pill. In 2005 Livedoor made a hostile bid for Nippon 
Broadcasting Service (“NBS”). To block the bid, NBS issued a 
slug of warrants to its affiliate, Fuji Television. The Tokyo High 
Court ruled that the issuance of warrants was invalid because its 
“primary purpose” was to block a hostile bid, but then went on to 
add detailed (and gratuitous) dicta that established four new 
detailed categories of “abusive acquirers” which it would be OK 
to try to block using warrants. Where these four new categories 
came from, or what they had to do with the disposition of the 
case, were never explained. Then, in 2007, Bulldog Sauce 
shareholders voted to cause the company to issue warrants, the 
effect of which was coercively to cash out Steel Partners as a 
shareholder. The Tokyo District Court, ignoring both the old 
“primary purpose” cases as well as the Livedoor-NBS “abusive 
acquirer” categories, created yet another rule, to the effect that if 
a large number of shareholders approve an issuance of warrants 
against a specific bidder, the approval is presumptive evidence 
that the bidder was somehow “abusive” and deserved to have his 
bid blocked. The Tokyo High Court, on appeal, then went in a 
completely different direction and redefined “abusive acquirer” 
to mean any profit-motivated financial investor that was not in 
the same business as the target company. The Supreme Court 
ended up with a position that was similar to, but again somewhat 
distinct from, the District Court. In none of the cases is there a 
specific discussion of what the relevant precedents are or of what 
the lower courts actually say. The whole process is a kind of 
legal shadow boxing that leads to results that are pulled out of a 
black box.
These large differences in judicial style, at the same time, do 
not mean that one system generates results that are markedly 
more “predictable” or even more “rational” or “scientific” than 
those generated by the other. In a homogeneous intellectual 
culture like Japan’s, members of the Japanese legal community 
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will be guided by an unwritten collective common sense that 
accurately anticipates litigation outcomes (and their predictions 
will be far more accurate than, for example, those of professional 
investment managers, applying sophisticated models, who so 
often underperform the dartboard method of picking stocks).
Therefore, the difference is not one of outcome or predictability, 
but of methodology and consistency. The Japanese methodology 
is vaguer, less dependent on an articulation of rights, rules and 
precedents, and guided by what clearly appears to be a different 
definition of “consistency.” The Japanese judicial process (and 
therefore the litigation process) recapitulates and is an extension 
of the tentative and incremental adjustment of interests and 
relationships among those seated around the table that is such a 
central feature of Japanese life.
As I will argue in the final section, one very predictable 
feature of Japanese litigation is that it will be drawn out, impose 
multiple pressures on the parties to split their differences out of 
court, and ultimately, should the parties ignore those pressures, 
award the plaintiff economic relief that is disappointingly modest 
by American standards. This combination of disincentives to 
litigate both reflects and reinforces the underlying reality of a 
culture that is reluctant to resolve disputes in the crystalline 
language of rights, rules, precedents and principles.
As my last exhibit of vagueness in the realm of private law I 
offer the communitarian “stakeholder-centric” vision of the 
corporation propounded by Japanese courts. When addressing 
corporate law issues such as the validity of “poison pills” and 
other techniques to impede unwanted takeovers, Japanese courts 
have responded with an intellectually incoherent philosophy that 
pays lip service to the objective of maximizing “corporate value” 
on behalf of shareholders at the same time it imposes a 
countervailing “corporate responsibility” to serve and balance 
the interests of multiple constituents or stakeholders: employees, 
suppliers, customers as well as the surrounding community. The 
Tokyo High Court’s 2007 Bulldog Sauce decision is the most 
poignant recent judicial statement of this typically Japanese 
tendency to blur boundaries and split logically irreconcilable 
propositions down the middle:
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A corporation is in theory an organization with the goal of 
maximizing corporate value for distribution to shareholders, 
but at the same time a corporation cannot insist on the goal of 
profit alone. It has a social existence, it embraces employees 
within it, and has external relationships with suppliers and 
customers through which it gains profits. Profits must be seen
in the context of these other relationships with employees, 
customers, suppliers and the surrounding community, i.e. the 
corporation’s stakeholders. It is not possible to view corporate 
value simply in terms of the corporation’s own profits. Steel 
Partners has no interest in participating in Bulldog Sauce’s 
management and is only interested in getting profits from 
increases in stock price. As such it is an abusive acquirer. Its 
aim is to get a majority of the company’s shares, control it, 
and use control as a means of making a profit for itself. It has 
no perspective on the good management of the company and 
thereby in fact reduces the corporation’s corporate value and 
reduces the economic wellbeing of other shareholders. It is 
wholly reasonable to discriminate against an abusive acquirer 
such as this. When there is a threat of this kind, a company is 
wholly justified in taking defensive measures.45
As writers in the “law and economics” school have pointed 
out, logically speaking, a corporation’s raison d’etre either is to 
maximize shareholder value, or it is not.46 Establishing 
shareholder value as the overriding objective management is 
required to pursue creates a clear standard that, if one believes 
the market works well in general and in the long run, should
naturally and automatically maximize collective economic 
interests. Conversely, telling management that they must 
maximize both shareholder value and that of other stakeholders 
creates an equation that cannot be simultaneously solved and is 
hopelessly confusing. If nothing else, shareholder value is a clear 
and logically coherent standard that also happens to embody the 
most fundamental values of market-oriented liberalism. Beyond 
45. Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] July 9, 2007, 1806 Shoji 
Homu 40, 47 (Japan).
46. FRANK H. EASTERBRROK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 35 – 39 (1991).
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its simplicity and clarity, it embraces a vision of shareholders 
and other market participants as competing atoms that, in the 
dynamic process of mutual collision, unconsciously optimize 
collective welfare.
By contrast, the Japanese “stakeholder” value theory of the 
corporation reflected in the Bulldog Sauce decision fogs over the
inherent irreconcilability of two standards, one of which 
commands management to serve one master and the other of 
which commands it to serve multiple masters. As we have seen, 
blurring the edges in this (unprincipled) way is a recurrent 
feature of Japanese legal thinking. Old fashioned Japanese give-
and-take among the parties seated at the table by its nature 
requires the participants not to think too hard about logical 
consistency. The Bulldog Sauce decision poignantly captures 
this characteristic intellectual fog in the prototypical Japanese 
context of reconciling multiple interests in the old fashioned 
Japanese way. When corporate management in America is faced 
with a decision to shut down an unprofitable factory or resist an 
unwanted takeover, the standard on which they make their 
decision is reasonably clear. In Japan, on the other hand, the law 
gives no direction other than to invite the parties to come 
together and commence sincere discussions.
III. CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO JAPANESE 
LAW REVISITED
John Haley’s 1978 article “The Myth of the Reluctant 
Litigant” started a movement in the small world of Western 
scholars of Japanese law that rejects as “myth” the claim by 
Japanese scholars, led by Kawashima, that Japanese have a 
distinct “legal consciousness” based on Japan’s culture and 
history. In particular, Haley and his successors have dismissed as 
“myth” the claim that the Japanese are somehow innately less 
eager to resort to court than citizens of other countries. The fact 
that the number of civil lawsuits per capita is significantly 
smaller in Japan of course cannot be denied—the question is 
“Why?”
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Haley’s original explanation for the lower litigation rate was 
“institutional” obstacles, primarily too few lawyers and judges 
and other impediments such as the requirement that plaintiffs 
post expensive bonds as a precondition of filing certain kinds of 
suits.47 More recent institutional explanations by Western legal 
scholars, led by Mark Ramseyer, have focused on the 
predictability of Japanese litigation outcomes in relatively 
routinized areas such as traffic accident law; if potential litigants 
know with reasonable certainty the probable outcome of 
litigation in advance, the argument goes, they will tend to settle 
out of court without going through an expensive lawsuit.48
Both of these analyses broadly imply that, people being 
people, if the institutional obstacles could somehow be magically 
removed and the Japanese litigation system looked more like the 
U.S. system, Japanese would sue each other with the same 
frequency and eagerness as Americans. So, the implicit logic 
goes, if there were only more lawyers and judges, or if Japanese 
judges delivered judgments and damages awards that were less 
predictable, then Japanese litigation rates would naturally rise to 
U.S. levels. Note the universalistic “people are people” values 
and assumptions that are quietly embedded here. Note also the 
typically Axial attitudes in the urge to expose received wisdom 
as “myth.”
The dichotomy posited between “cultural” and “institutional” 
factors seems obtuse and one-dimensional to me: the two are 
necessarily deeply interdependent and interactive. Institutions 
reflect culture, in some sense are culture. Haley and Ramseyer 
are both of course correct that institutional obstacles to litigation 
do exist in Japan, many of which they in fact overlook. One 
important institutional factor is an effective cap on damages.
What is predictable is that there will never be any multimillion 
dollar judgments for cases involving asbestos, nuclear radiation, 
47. HALEY, supra note 4. Haley’s argument is further elaborated in
AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX, 83 (1991).
48. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Comparative Litigation 
Rates (Draft of November 7, 2010), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_681.pdf.
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toxic shock syndrome, tobacco, securities class actions, treble 
damage and punitive damages, and other potential jackpots for 
plaintiffs and their lawyers. What is also predictable is that 
litigation will take time, and can be stretched out for many years 
by foot-dragging defendants.49 This is not the result of an 
undersupply of judges and lawyers, but the time-honored 
practice of the courts. The famous Minamata case is a fitting 
emblem of “time” as a major “institutional” barrier not 
mentioned by Haley and Ramseyer: a case in which 2,955 people 
contracted Minamata disease (mercury poisoning), and 1,784 
died, as a result of the dumping of mercury into Minamata Bay
by Chisso Corporation; the ultimate outcome of this case, 22 
years after the lawsuit was commenced, was a total award of 
roughly two million U.S. dollars against Chisso Corporation and 
$700,000 against the Japanese government.
Yet other litigation contexts reveal additional “institutional” 
obstacles that frustrate plaintiffs and dampen the incentive to 
initiate a lawsuit. Take divorce. The divorcing couple must first 
submit to compulsory (but non-binding) conciliation for six 
months or more before filing suit. This is a welcome opportunity 
for a recalcitrant defendant to buy time. A plaintiff seeking 
economic relief in the form of a division of property, alimony or 
child support is stymied by a lack of compulsory discovery rules 
49. Mark Ramseyer points out that the arithmetic means of civil 
damages awards and lengths of civil trials are comparable in Japan and the U.S.
A critical difference, however, as Ramseyer himself points out, is the absence 
of “jackpot” awards in Japan that create incentives on the part of plaintiffs and 
their lawyers to litigate. In addition, comparing the length of civil trials in the 
two jurisdictions is to compare apples and oranges. In the U.S., the actual trial 
takes place in a single continuous proceeding that can take from a few hours to 
a few weeks. What determines the length of the proceeding is (1) the intensity 
of pre-trial motions and discovery and (2) the degree of congestion in the court 
that determines when the actual trial can be scheduled, a matter over which the 
litigants have no control. In Japan, the trial takes place in one or two hour 
sessions that take place monthly over many months. Unlike the practice in the 
U.S., Japanese litigation parties and the judge all have a large degree of control 
over the length of the trial. Typically judges are reluctant to settle a case on the 
merits and will keep scheduling monthly trial sessions until the parties come to 
a negotiated settlement.
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and related enforcement mechanisms that make it easy for the 
defendant to hide assets and avoid penalty if caught cheating.
Even after a court orders a division of property, alimony or child 
support, the court has limited power to compel the defendant to 
pay up. There are no criminal deadbeat father statutes as in the 
U.S. Courts are reluctant to get involved in child custody issues 
at all, with the result that actual physical custody of a child is 
tantamount to legal custody. Child visitation orders can be freely 
ignored without fear of sanctions. The end result of weak courts 
and modest monetary awards is much the same as in the case of 
vague contracts: knowledge that the parties (and especially the 
plaintiff) are unlikely to get satisfaction in court leads to 
negotiated out of court resolutions of divorces, at modest 
amounts, in an overwhelming percentage of cases. Further 
upstream, the weakness of the legal system encourages 
prospective marriage partners (and their families) to protect 
themselves by performing due diligence, and obtaining reliable 
references and other assurances of trustworthiness and 
creditworthiness before registering their marriages, which in turn 
presumably results in less divorce-prone marriages downstream.
The list of “institutional obstacles” multiplies as one explores 
other areas of litigation. The artificiality of disentangling these 
“institutional barriers” from underlying “culture” becomes clear 
as one starts imagining what the Japanese litigation landscape 
would look like if the “institutional barriers” were dismantled 
and replaced with American counterparts—discovery, the jury 
system, contempt of court sanctions with real teeth, joint child 
custody, punitive damages, etc. Quite simply, Japan would no 
longer be Japan. The notion that “but for” the specified 
“institutional barriers” Japanese would be merrily litigating away 
just like Americans overlooks the fact that the “institutional 
barriers” did not arise out of thin air but are themselves 
reflections and products of an underlying culture. The multiple
and complex embodiments of culture - including “institutional 
barriers”- are all one ball of wax that cannot be selectively 
untangled.
Obviously, culture is not static and institutions change.
Following the publication of “The Myth of the Reluctant 
876 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
Litigant” in 1978 Japan lowered two “institutional barriers” cited 
by Haley by substantially increasing the number of Japanese 
lawyers and reducing or eliminating the requirement of litigation 
bonds in shareholder derivative actions. As a result of a large 
new supply of lawyers in recent years, it is true that litigation 
rates have slightly increased—but not nearly in proportion to the 
increase in the lawyer population. The elimination of expensive 
bond requirements for shareholder derivative suits resulted in a 
slight and temporary increase in derivative actions, but the 
volume of such litigation is still miniscule by U.S. standards.
Law itself is an “institution.” Under the U.S. post-War 
Occupation, the Japanese were force fed a constitution, a 
company code, a securities code and an antitrust statute - all of 
which were essentially carbon copies of U.S. equivalents. The 
way in which Japan actually applied those laws to life as it is 
lived, during the 60 years that followed, is starkly different from 
the way in which those laws are applied in the U.S.
America also bestowed baseball on Japan. The rules are the 
same in both countries, but the way baseball is played, including 
field tactics and strategy, fan behavior in the stands, etc., are all 
strikingly different.50 Among other things, there is no booing in 
50. The reductionist tendency of the “institutional” approach reveals 
itself in Ramseyer and Nakazato’s paper aiming to debunk the “myth” that 
Japanese and American baseball are different games: “Our dataset offers a test 
of [Robert] Whiting’s hypothesis, and it suggests he is wrong: Japanese owners 
bid for players offering the same attributes American owners want. Owners 
must attract fans to the stadiums, buyers to the merchandise retailers, and 
viewers to the television broadcasts. Toward that end, they will bid for the 
players want to see (though fans in turn seem not to bid enough for tickets and 
merchandise to let the teams break even). Japanese owners may pay 
substantially lower salaries than American owners, but -- as a comparison of 
regressions indicates -- they pay for the same qualities. Apparently, Japanese 
and American fans prize the same game.” Ramseyer and Nakazato point out the 
obvious correlation in both countries between a player’s statistics and salary: 
the higher the batting average, the higher the salary. To jump from that obvious 
correlation to the conclusion that game is played the same in both countries (or 
more mincingly, “Japanese and American fans prize the same game”) will 
strike most knowledgeable baseball fans as risible. Minoru Nakazato & J. Mark 
Ramseyer, Bonuses and Biases in Japanese Baseball (Discussion Paper June 
2007) available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/
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Japan, no spitting on the field, and no brush back pitches. The 
differences are consistent with the underlying differences in 
culture.
The notion that “people are people” and that given the same 
institutional environment they will behave in the same way, of 
course, reflects typical Axial sensibilities that underlie 
individualism, Christianity and universalism. I can only 
speculate, but I sense a missionary spirit in the search for an 
“institutional” explanation of Japanese behavior. If only the 
“powers that be” would reform the external institutional 
environment, the thinking seems to be, the Japanese would be 
liberated to become more like us - more litigious, more 
egalitarian, more independent, more free-thinking. It simply 
cannot be that they are “naturally” less litigious, egalitarian, 
independent and free thinking than we are. The same spirit 
infuses the “End of History” school of thought: if only 
democracy and capitalism can be exported to the great unwashed 
regions of the world, peace and prosperity will bloom.51 The 
“End of History” viewpoint has suffered somewhat in recent 
years as it has crashed against reality in the Middle East and 
other uncooperative regions of the world. Culture is stubborn.
The institutional explanation of Japanese behavior offers an 
additional protective benefit to scholars working in highly 
politicized, race and gender-sensitive American universities. It is 
entirely consistent with the radical “people are people” idea that 
dominates the curriculum, admissions, recruitment and 
promotion policies of the academic establishment. Explaining 
Japanese behavior as unexceptional using statistical regression 
analysis offers a “scientifically” bullet-proof defense against 
charges of racism. As the reaction to the original presentation 
that evolved into this essay revealed to me, suggestions that 
pdf/Ramseyer_et%20al_589.pdf.
51. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE END OF MAN
(1991) (arguing that liberal democracy may constitute the “end point of 
mankind’s ideological evolution” and “the final form of human government” 
and as such may constitute “the end of history”).
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“people are different” now seem to verge on heresy within U.S. 
academic establishments outside of Japan.
The dismissal of culture in explaining Japanese law seems to 
me an ironic side effect of Axial ideological battles being fought 
outside of Japan. The fact that it is unconvincing to the Japanese 
themselves should raise the level of skepticism: who are these 
foreigners to tell the Japanese that their senses deceive them? I
also wonder whether the foreign advocates of “people are 
people” are themselves convinced: Why are we foreigners 
fascinated by Japan if not because at every turn it offers us 
glimpses of ancient ways of thinking and feeling that have 
disappeared elsewhere?
